Patañjali — Entity Summary
Summary
Patañjali is the compiler of the Yoga Sutras, 195 aphorisms in four books that systematise classical yoga. The text is terse to the point of opacity — Johnston notes it runs to "less than ten pages of large type in the original" — and has always been read through commentary. It defines yoga in its second line and spends the rest of the work unpacking that definition: "Yoga is the restriction of the fluctuations of mind-stuff" (Woods I.2). What it offers the corpus is a technical psychology of attention and a complete practical ethics, both older than and independent of the devotional framework the Bhagavad-Gita supplies.
The corpus holds it twice, deliberately — see ADR 0017. James Haughton Woods's 1914 Harvard Oriental Series rendering is the literal translation; Charles Johnston's 1912 "The Book of the Spiritual Man" is an interpretation that reads the sutras through Christian and Theosophical categories. Neither is the default; the gap between them is itself informative.
Dating: c. 400 CE, not BCE. The corpus recorded both dates before 2026-09-14, and the BCE figure was an artifact. It comes from identifying this Patañjali with Patañjali the grammarian, author of the Mahābhāṣya (c. 150 BCE) — an identification that appears in no Sanskrit text before Bhojadeva's Rājamārtaṇḍa in the 10th century, and that modern scholarship rejects on grounds of style and content. Philipp Maas's work on the manuscripts dates the Pātañjalayogaśāstra to roughly 400 CE. So the text is roughly contemporary with Augustine, not with the Buddha.
Key Claims
- Yoga is defined negatively, as restriction: "Yoga is the restriction of the fluctuations of mind-stuff" (Woods I.2). Not an attainment or an experience but the stilling of a process. I.3 gives the consequence: "Then the Seer [that is, the Self] abides in himself." The rest of Book I is the taxonomy of what fluctuates and how it is stilled.
- Five fluctuations, five hindrances: the mind's activity is classified into sources-of-valid-ideas, misconceptions, predicate-relations, sleep and memory (I.6); the obstacles into undifferentiated-consciousness, the feeling-of-personality, passion, aversion and the will-to-live (II.3). The system is diagnostic before it is prescriptive.
- Eight limbs, with ethics first: abstentions, observances, posture, breath-restraint, withdrawal of the senses, fixed-attention, contemplation, concentration (II.29). The five yamas — non-injury, truthfulness, abstaining from theft, from incontinence, from acceptance of gifts (II.30) — come first, before any practice of posture or breath.
- The yamas admit no exemptions: II.31 — "When they are unqualified by species or place or time or exigency and when [covering] all [these] classes — there is the Great Course-of-conduct." Four kinds of exemption are named and refused at once. II.34 extends culpability to injury "done or caused to be done or approved."
- Samkhya metaphysics underneath: the world is the interplay of the three guṇa (aspects), and the Seer — purusha — is a witness that does not itself change. Liberation (IV.34, "Isolation") is the disentangling of consciousness from nature, "the return of the power of pure Consciousness to its essential form."
- The powers are obstacles: Book III catalogues the siddhi — supernormal capacities arising from concentration — and then III.37 states that "in concentration these are obstacles." A practical safeguard against mistaking the by-products for the goal.
Connections
- [[concepts/nonviolence.md]] — Patañjali supplies the Vedic tradition's own exceptionless ahimsa, which reframes that page's central disagreement as internal to the tradition rather than between traditions
- [[entities/bhagavad-gita.md]] — the corpus's other Vedic voice, and the one Patañjali contradicts on exemption; they also differ on whether liberation is disentanglement or identity
- [[concepts/the-self.md]] — purusha as an eighth model of selfhood: an unchanging witness that is neither the Gita's atman-identical-with-Brahman nor Buddhist anatman
- [[concepts/dharma.md]] — the yamas are a universal ethics, in tension with svadharma's role-specific duty
- [[concepts/impermanence.md]] — the guṇa undergo ceaseless mutation while the Seer does not; a dualist answer to the question anicca and Taoist flux answer monistically
- [[entities/emerson-ralph-waldo.md]] — Johnston's interpretation reaches for "the Oversoul" and quotes Wordsworth and Emerson directly; Theosophy is one channel by which Vedic material reached American Transcendentalism
Contradictions
- Against the Gita, on exemption. II.31 refuses to qualify ahimsa by species, place, time or exigency; Krishna's argument to Arjuna turns on precisely his caste, his moment and his circumstance. Both texts are classical, Vedic, and canonical.
- Against the Gita, on metaphysics. Patañjali's Samkhya keeps purusha and prakriti irreducibly two, and calls their separation liberation. The Gita's trajectory is toward identity with Brahman. "Isolation" and "union" are not the same destination, despite yoga meaning union.
- Between the corpus's two renderings. Woods gives "Yoga is the restriction of the fluctuations of mind-stuff"; Johnston gives "Union, spiritual consciousness, is gained through control of the versatile psychic nature." Woods's aparigraha is "acceptance of gifts"; Johnston's is "covetousness," and his yamas are "Commandments." The second is a nineteenth-century Christian-Theosophical reading, and the corpus tags it as one.
Open Questions
- Is Johnston's overlay merely distorting, or does it also carry information — about how Indian philosophy was received in the English-speaking world around 1900 — that a literal translation cannot?
- The Yoga Sutras have always been read through Vyāsa's Yoga-Bhāshya. The corpus holds neither that commentary nor Vachaspati Miśra's gloss, though both sit in the Woods volume. Does the tradition's primary commentary belong in the corpus?
- Maas's argument that the sūtras and the Yogabhāṣya are one work by one author would mean the corpus's "translation vs. commentary" split — Woods's own framing, and the basis on which only the sūtra section was curated — reproduces a division the text may not originally have had. Does that change what should be curated?